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ABSTRACT'
In this symposium essay, we explore the theoretical
implications of one particular type of fiscal limitation on state
legislatures-namely special Tax Increase Limitation rules
(TILs). We argue that there is no meaningful content to the term
"tax increase" as used in TILs. This incoherence allows
legislative majorities who wish to do so to circumvent TILs. This
fact about TILs, among others, explains the observed inefficacy of
TILs in shrinking the size of state governments.
Furthermore, TILs are not just harmless political theater.
When combined with other common features of state fiscal
constitutions, particularly Balanced Budget Requirements
(BBRs), they tend to amplify revenue volatility. Revenue
volatility is far from an imagined horrible, but is currently
creating severe challenges for state revenue systems. Moreover,
TILs potentially undermine jurisdictional competition, which is a
relatively more effective means for controlling the size of
government.
INTRODUCTION2
Special fiscal requirements are a common feature of state
constitutions.3  In this essay, we will make an analytic
observation about one type of fiscal requirement-tax increase
limitations or TILs. By TILs we mean provisions that require a
legislative supermajority in order for taxes to be "increased." For
example, in California, "[a]ny change in state statute which
results in any taxpayer paying a higher tax * * * must be imposed
by an act passed by not less than two-thirds of all members
elected to each of the two houses of the Legislature .... ."' It is
I This essay is an expanded version of two earlier papers the authors
previously published in State Tax Notes: David Gamage & Darien Shanske, On
Tax Increase Limitations: Part I - A Costly Incoherence, 62 ST. TAX NOTES 813
(2011) [hereinafter Part 1]; David Gamage & Darien Shanske, On Tax Increase
Limitations: Part II- Evasion and Transcendence, 64 ST. TAX NOTEs 245 (2012)
[hereinafter Part I1].
2 Portions of the Introduction of this article are taken from Part 1, supra note
1.
3 For a recent catalog and critical perspective, see Richard C. Schragger,
Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860, 866 (2011). Note that Schragger does
not specifically address TILs. Note also that TILs are often proposed to be
included in the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 23, 112th Cong. § 4 (2011).
4 CAL. CONST. art. 13A, § 3(a); see also ARIZ. CONST. art. 9, § 22(A) (Arizona
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well-known that these regimes have questionable effectiveness, at
least insofar as their goal is to curb the growth of government, or
even simply to change the pattern of government expenditures in
the applicable state relative to other states not similarly
constrained.' The dominant explanations for this failure of TILs
involve the ambivalence of voters and/or conniving of politicians.6
Without casting doubt on these explanations, we think it
important to make an analytic observation that we believe also
contributes to the explanation of the observed phenomenon of the
ineffectiveness of TILs.
Our key analytic observation is that TILs insert two
conceptually vacuous notions--"tax" and "increase"--into the
fiscal constitutions of the states that have them. It is at least in
part because this combination is incoherent that TILs do not
work.
We are not going to focus on evaluating related parts of state
fiscal constitutions-provisions that are often grouped together
with TILs 7-namely: tax and expenditure limitations, state or
local debt limitations, special state or local procedural rules for
debt issuance,8 state and local balanced budget rules, or tax
increase limitations at the local level.9 This is because all of these
requires a two-thirds vote when providing for an increase in state revenue
through such means as taxation, state fees or assessments). Related regimes
require voter pre-approval before taxes can be raised. See, e.g., COLO. CONST.
art. X, § 20(4)(a). Colorado also has a supermajority, two-thirds, requirement as
to raising taxes in an "emergency." Id. art. X § 6(a).
I See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins & Ellen Moule, Making Mountains of Debt
Out of Molehills: The Pro-Cyclical Implications of Tax and Expenditure
Limitations, 63 NAT'L TAX J. 603, 603 (2010); BRUCE E. CAIN & GEORGE A.
(SANDY) MACKENZIE, PUB. POL'Y INST. CAL., ARE CALIFORNIA'S FISCAL
CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONAL OR POLITICAL? 4 (2008), http://www.ppic.org/content/
pubs/report/R_1208BCR.pdf.
6 See also CAIN & MACKENZIE, supra note 5, at 25-26.
7 As a historical matter, TILs are a relatively recent phenomenon compared
to some of these other provisions, particularly BBRs. They have been passed in
the last few decades as part of larger tax and expenditure limitations (TELs).
Isabel Rodriguez-Tejedo & John Joseph Wallis, Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal
Crises, in WHEN STATES Go BROKE 9, 23 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel,
Jr. eds., 2012). We focus our discussion on TILs.
8 Rodriguez-Tejedo and Wallis emphasize the difference between absolute
limitations on debt and special procedural rules for debt. Id. at 20. They go on
to argue, convincingly, that the special procedural rules for taking on debt have
actually been relatively successful in channeling state and local borrowing. Id.
at 10, 24-27. We return to debt limitation procedures infra Part II.C.
9 We will initially focus on state-level TILs because, as will become clear,
many of the issues with TILs that we discuss, e.g., their interaction with
extensive income tax systems, are typical of states and not localities. However,
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provisions, at least arguably, have a different conceptual
justification and content. The various kinds of debt limitation
regimes, for example, can be justified as important for
generational equity; and local tax rules may reflect a reasonable
concern with tax exporting or a desire to enhance local democratic
participation." We will discuss how these provisions interact
with TILs, but our purpose is not to evaluate these provisions in
their own right.
The problem with tax increase limitation regimes at the state
level is that these regimes must successfully define the notion of
a "tax increase." Yet, to borrow a striking image from Daniel
Shaviro, attempting to make analytic sense of this concept is like
playing a game of "Pin the Tail on the Donkey[;]" we are all spun
around and may end up pinning the tail anywhere at all.''
I. SEEING THROUGH THE "RAISING TAXES" MIRAGE
Just as one needs time to adjust one's eyes to seeing in the
dark, so too one must go through several steps to see through the
vacuity of TILs.
A. Step 1: Spending through the Tax System
We will begin with a famous example from David Bradford. 2
Bradford imagined a "Weapons Supply Tax Credit" granted to
arms manufacturers. The arms manufacturers would get a tax
credit in the amount of the value of arms they deliver to the U.S.
we discuss local-level TILs infra Part II.D.
0o See Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal
Limits and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 947-49 (2003) (on
debt limitations); Kirk J. Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, 96 Nw. U. L. REV.
191, 216-17 (2001) (on local tax limitation regimes). Neither Briffault nor Stark
argue that current versions of these limitations are actually achieving these
other goals. See also, Yilin Hou & Daniel L. Smith, Do State Balanced Budget
Requirements Matter? Testing Two Explanatory Frameworks, 145 PUB. CHOICE
57, 78 (2009) (finding some effect of certain balanced budget rule regimes).
" See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, TAXES, SPENDING, AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S
MARCH TOWARD BANKRUPTCY 16 (2007); see also David Gamage & Jeremy
Bearer-Friend, Managing Fiscal Volatility by Redefining 'Tax Cuts' and 'Tax
Hikes', 58 ST. TAX NOTES 1, 9 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/p
apers.cfm?abstract id=1690614## (arguing the labels are often arbitrary and
misleading).
12 DANIEL SHAVIRO, Do DEFICITS MATTER? 101-02 (1997) [hereinafter
DEFICITS].
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government, say for a maximum of $100 billion. 3 The U.S.
government would then reduce spending by that very same
amount, $100 billion. 4 The government could then claim to have
slashed taxes and spending without compromising national
security or reducing overall allocations to public services. As Ed
Kleinbard observes, this anecdote "illustrate[s] the empty
formalism of our concepts of Government revenues and
Government expenditures."'5  It is easy enough to change the
numbers so that taxes decrease and real spending increases, say
the credits are $150 billion, or just about any other combination
one might imagine."
There is no need to imagine much as governments have
frequently engaged in Bradford-type maneuvers. As Kleinbard
notes, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) is full of tax credits
awarded to private entities in return for satisfying the
government's substantive policy goals. These credits are often
even administered not solely by the IRS but by the federal agency
with substantive expertise, such as the Department of Energy for
"[qualif[ied]] gasification projects."'7  State tax systems are, of
course, full of similar credits. 8
Daniel Shaviro offers a different, real life example of Bradford's
insight.' 9 In 1993, the Clinton administration proposed taxing a
greater proportion of a recipient's social security benefits under
the federal income tax. The Clinton administration reasoned that
B This simple example assumes the manufacturers have sufficient income;
one can also imagine a refundable credit.
14 DEFICITS, supra note 12, at 101-02.
1' Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax
Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2010).
16 For further discussion, see David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays
on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 51-
53 (2011) [hereinafter Three Essays].
'7 Kleinbard, supra note 15, at 2 (citing 2009-16 I.R.B. 802, a notice about
implementing I.R.C. § 48B).
1' See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6010.8 (West 1998) (granting the
California Alternative Energy and Advanced Transportation Financing
Authority power to grant sales and use tax exclusions). For a full listing of tax
expenditures in California, see, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, TAX EXPENDITURE
REPORT (2011-12), http://www.dof.ca.gov/research/documents/Tax Expenditure
Rptll-12-Web.pdf. At least 47 states provide some information on their tax
expenditures. See Tax Expenditure Reports, INST. ON TAXATION AND ECON.
POLICY, http://www.itep.org/other-resources/state-tereport.php (last visited Jan.
16, 2013).
'9 Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57
TAX L. REV. 187, 192-94 (2004).
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this should count as a "spending cut" because, in effect, the
federal government would be out less money.2 ° However, this
characterization was challenged, including by the Congressional
Budget Office, which claimed that this was really tantamount to
a tax increase because additional revenue would be raised
through the tax system, rather than through smaller checks cut
by the Social Security Administration.2' In terms of policy, the
issue of nomenclature was vacuous, but the issue was important
in terms of politics precisely because it mattered in what ratio the
Administration combined spending cuts and tax increases. State
constitutions, through having special rules for tax increases,
essentially mandate that legislators contort themselves in
similarly parsing taxing from spending.
In the end, our first analytic point relies on the fact that state
tax systems, like the federal system, are riddled with so-called
"tax expenditures:" that is, governments are spending money on
desired programs through the tax code. Limiting "tax increases,"
therefore, does not limit spending through tax expenditures, nor
does it prevent politicians from raising more revenue by reducing
tax expenditures.
B. Step 2: No Ideal Tax Baseline
It could perhaps be objected that this problem can be fixed. If
only politicians were barred from using tax expenditures,22 then
they would only have one option if they wanted to fund a new
program without incurring debt, increase tax rates. In such a
world, TILs would have more bite. But it is not so simple. First,
the search for a firm definition of what constitutes a "tax
expenditure" has been elusive; there is no ideal baseline for any
tax. Take the example of the deduction allowed for state and
local taxes. The federal government lists this provision as a tax
expenditure,23 but it is arguably appropriate on traditional
income tax grounds because it reflects the fact that certain
taxpayers are less well off to the extent that they pay higher state
and local taxes that do not benefit them.24
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Of course, it is not at all clear how this could be achieved.
23 I.R.C. § 164 (2008). See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013, at 44-45 (2010),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3642.
24 See generally Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of
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And so the failure to agree on a tax expenditure budget is not
just a matter of politics, but also a result of deep and seemingly
intractable conceptual puzzles.25 Furthermore, constitutional law
or other legal/political constraints sometimes impel federal and
state legislatures to operate through tax expenditures. 6 The
recent ACA decision, upholding the ACA as an exercise of the
taxing power, is only the most recent and dramatic decision in
this line.27 For instance, last term, the Supreme Court authorized
states to subsidize religious schools through the tax code when
they could not subsidize them directly.28
C. Step 3: Wrong Question
Perhaps it is possible that some rough baseline could be
established for "tax expenditures";" and that this baseline could
be made enforceable," and that thereby the notion of "tax
State and Local Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 416-
18 (1996).
25 For a recent summary of the global failure to define tax expenditures or
limit their use, see generally Steven A. Dean, The Tax Expenditure Budget is a
Zombie Accountant, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 265 (2012).
26 See Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the
Choice of Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 841-42 (2012).
27 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012); see also
David Gamage, The Supreme Court's Health Care Decision and the Problem with
Relying on the Taxing Power, BERKELEY BLOG (June 29, 2012), http:/Iblogs.
berkeley.edu/2012/06/29/the-supreme-courts-health-care-decision-and-the-
problem-with-relying-on-the-taxing-power/.
28 Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447 (2011).
29 Edward D. Kleinbard puts the point this way:
I will say, however, that having read a large swath of the academic
literature in this area, I believe much of the criticism has been
overblown, and that the legislative process has been the worse for it.
Tax expenditure analysis is a pragmatic exercise, and the existence of
a handful of close questions should not obscure the fact that literally
hundreds of other cases can be labeled as tax expenditures without
much controversy.
Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures
Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 1, 7
(2010).
30 We think not, of course, because, among other reasons, almost every tax
expenditure becomes a hard question when focused upon. Pace id. at 1. Even if
tax expenditure reform can be done at a distance, which is not impossible, then
the question becomes should we be asking whether a provision is a tax
expenditure. See Darien Shanske, Testimony on California's Tax Expenditure
Programs and their Effectiveness Joint Oversight Hearing: Assessing Tax
Expenditure Programs in Light of California's Fiscal Challenges 1, 3-4 (2012),
http://arev.assembly.ca.gov/sites/arev.assembly.ca.gov/files/Testimony%20of%20
Darien%20Shanske.pdf. As argued in this section, we do not think so.
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increase" could be given some practical substance. But the
question would then become whether this notion of "tax
increases" would be of any use; we think it would not. We will
start with the broadest substantive issues made murky by the
focus on "tax increases."
1. Allocation and Distribution
The efficiency and equity of a unified system of taxing and
spending are substantive questions. It may not matter whether
taxing social security benefits is a "tax increase" or a "spending
decrease," but it matters as a consideration of equity a great deal
whether social security is, in effect, means-tested. Furthermore,
as a consideration of the efficient allocation of government
resources, it matters a great deal whether the SALT deduction is
encouraging efficient or inefficient uses of government resources.
Whether these issues should be categorized as "tax increases" is
beside the point.
2. Tax System or Other Government Bureaucracy?
We have seen that bringing content to the term "tax increases"
requires vilifying tax expenditures; but is this appropriate? In
many cases, we think not. It can be highly desirable on both
allocative and distributive grounds to use the tax system to
achieve social ends that could be plausibly characterized as tax
expenditures.31 In the alternative, it could be sensible to use a
non-tax agency to achieve a "tax" objective; assuming we could
agree on what a tax objective would be.32
Because using the tax system for apparently non-tax ends is
more common, and because, as discussed above, it is the
expedient that is so threatening to TILs, this is the scenario we
will focus on and justify, at least as a general possibility.
Consider government support for higher education; and suppose
"1 Cf. SHAVIRO, supra note 12, at 30-40 (applying Musgrave's allocative and
distributive roles of government to analysis of taxing and spending); see
generally David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and
Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004) (arguing for pragmatic analysis of
whether a program should be administered through the tax code).
32 If it is a tax objective to lower the rate of tax on certain energy
investments, then choosing to administer tax credits through federal or state
energy agencies, as discussed above, would qualify as an example of using a
non-tax agency to administer a tax program.
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we would like a government program making higher education
more broadly available to be administered in proportion to
income.3 To reach this distributive goal most efficiently we
might reasonably wish to use the income tax system, because the
tax bureaucracy is already aware of a taxpayer's income. This is
not necessarily the case, but it is surely plausible and will be true
for some programs at least some of the time.
We can go further. We observed above that certain tax
expenditures are actually administered, in part, by the agencies
with substantive expertise, such as the Department of Energy
administering energy credits.34 This observation clearly goes to
the blurry distinction between taxing and spending; it also goes to
the point we are making in this subsection, namely that this
blurring may be desirable. The IRS does not have all the
expertise to distinguish worthwhile programs. Thus, if it makes
sense to subsidize certain programs through the tax system,
which seems likely, then administering the program jointly
between the IRS and another agency could be highly sensible.35
Viewing all such arrangements as suspect is shortsighted.
In sum, even if we could ban tax expenditures in order to make
TILs effective, we should not want to; because tax expenditures
may sometimes be the best policy option, at least insofar as
labeling a program as a "tax expenditure" facilitates the program
being administered through the tax bureaucracy.
3. Taxation or Other Governmental Intervention (e.g., Regulation)?
As indicated by our arguments in Step 1, TILs encourage
legislatures to use tax expenditures rather than ordinary
spending funded by ordinary taxes. Though, as just noted, this
can be sensible, it is not always the case, and it is perilous to
structure state fiscal constitutions in a way that further
encourages the use of expenditures rather than taxes. In
particular, as already noted, legislators already have plenty of
political and legal incentive to operate by doling out subsidies,
"carrots," to achieve a desired goal rather than achieving that
goal through taxation, particularly Pigouvian taxation, which is
33 Example drawn from Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 31, at 980.
31 See supra Part I.A.
31 Cf. Daniel Halperin, Tax Expenditures: Budget Control and the Nonprofit
Sector, 2012 TAX NOTES 447, 448-49.
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essentially a stick to prevent an undesired behavior.36 Consider a
policy to prevent pollution. Giving subsidies to polluters not to
pollute drains the fisc of public tax dollars and makes those
harming the environment better off.37  There can also be
unexpected consequences-rich subsidies to a "clean" industry
might lead to too many participants in the industry or even more
pollution.38 At the very least, more participants than expected
can make the expenditure more expensive than expected.39
Taxing the negative externality will often seem to be the superior
choice, and yet TILs, by encouraging tax expenditures, will
consistently impel states to prefer subsidies.
There is a similar issue as to the choice to use taxation or
regulation. It is well understood that regulations can act as
substitutes for taxation.4" This is a specific illustration of the
previous point about the continuity between the tax bureaucracy
and other parts of the government. The aspect we emphasize in
this subsection is the continuity between different kinds of
government interventions. Sometimes it makes allocative andior
distributive sense to use a regulation, other times a tax. TILs put
pressure on governments to use regulations and not taxes,4' but
in many cases taxes might be the more desirable option on
allocative or distributive grounds. Thus, for instance, economists
tend to favor the use of carbon taxes to combat global warming;42
however, such taxes, as "taxes", are off the table politically, in
part because a state, such as California, could not impose or
increase carbon taxes without a two-thirds majority.43
The fixation on avoiding tax increases can do more than
influence the choice of government action; it can also shape the
36 Following Galle, supra note 26, at 813 ("Sticks are cheaper, more effective,
accord better with our moral intuitions, and avoid unwanted incentives to create
new harms.").
3 Id. at 799.
38 Id. at 811.
3 All examples and arguments drawn from id. at 811-27; Galle also notes
that there is a place for carrots.
40 For discussion, see Three Essays, supra note 16, at 53.
4 A recent working paper found evidence for this. Noel D. Johnson et al.,
Pick Your Poison: Do Politicians Regulate When They Can't Spend? 28 (George
Mason Univ. Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 12-53, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2035611.
42 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global
Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming
than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 6-7 (2009).
"3 Kathleen K. Wright, The Aftermath of California's Proposition 26, 62 ST.
TAX NOTES 471, 471 (2011)
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choice of tax base. "For instance, if tax rates cannot be increased
without a super-majority, legislatures have an incentive to favor
tax bases that show significant revenue growth."44  Of course,
those tax bases also tend to be more volatile, encouraging a feast
or famine pattern of state budgeting where state governments
both expand and contract according to ever more severe cycles. 5
a. Special Case of Fees
It is not controversial that the price mechanism is the gold
standard for achieving allocative efficiency and, not surprisingly,
economists have urged government regulators to use the price
mechanism to the extent possible-for instance, using tolls to
regulate use of a bridge. 6 Such quasi-market levies are based on
the benefit principle. That is, each user of a government service
is charged in proportion to how much that user benefits. We
should note right away that in many ways a toll is as much a top-
down command as a regulation as to the number of cars allowed
on a bridge, say by permit, would be. Yet the toll (i.e., a tax-like
intervention), makes more sense because we do not want to create
a new bridge permit bureaucracy, because of the administrative
expense and uncertainty as to the optimal number of vehicles.
What we wish to achieve is to send a relatively flexible price
signal as to the cost of driving in order to try to cause drivers to
internalize the externalities caused by their driving.
Fees, insofar as they are a regulation that raises revenue for
government programs, are particularly fungible with taxes.
There is no clear line between what a tax is and what a fee is. At
the one end is a user fee, say for trash pickup, and at the other
end a national tax, say the federal income tax. We will just
stipulate that the federal income tax is not a fee, but there is a
broad continuum among many other taxes and fees. For
instance, take a user fee for trash collection. This user fee is an
average price, not likely the cost of your trash pickup and, indeed,
buried in the price of pickup may well be cross-subsidies for other
users required by government regulation. Thus even this fee is
not a perfect price and thus is "tax-like." And then consider local
"Part 1, supra note 1.
41 David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal
Volatility Problem, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 749, 759 (2010) [hereinafter Preventing
State Budget Crises].
46 Id. at 758.
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property taxes; they are more tied to specific benefits than federal
income taxes, but they are less tied to a specific benefit than a
trash collection fee. Even state-level taxes are tied to the benefit
principle to some extent; there is at least some mobility between
states and it would seem that some taxpayers move to the
package of taxes and spending that they desire. This perplexity
as to the nature of state and local taxes is at the root of the
difficulties in analyzing the SALT deduction using ordinary
income tax principles. Making the fee-tax question so important
puts enormous pressure on tax-fee jurisprudence."
Special rules about taxes versus fees are a distraction from the
hard question of whether fees or taxes are preferable in
particular cases. For instance, does it make sense to advance the
use of recycling by means of regulation or by fees? TILs should
not be relevant to this discussion.
D. Step 4: Random Direction, At Best
It could be maintained that at least TILs exert some sort of
pressure to shrink the size of government, and should therefore
be supported even if this would require relying on crude
distinctions and giving up on certain desirable policy tools. Yet
even this is not so. Suppose, as many critics contend, that TILs
encourage the use of regulation when taxing would be more
allocatively efficient, then TILs have in effect increased the size of
government.48 This is because the most rigorous definition of the
size of government refers to how much government activity
distorts the economy as compared to an appropriate baseline, and
adding new inefficient regulations distorts the economy more, not
47 In California, for instance, tax limitations of various kinds have
encouraged the state and local governments to raise revenue with "non-taxes."
When courts have upheld the use of these non-taxes, additional voter
propositions have often followed. Currently California governments are
absorbing the latest tax limitation initiative, Proposition 26, passed in
November 2010. Proposition 26, which added sections to Articles 13A and 13C
of the California Constitution, explicitly aimed to narrow the definition of a
"fee," responding to one California Supreme Court case in particular. See
Shanske, supra note 30, at 1. The litigation over the meaning of Proposition 26
has already begun. Wright, supra note 43. Yet this is far from a California
problem; battles over the tax-fee distinction are endemic to other states with
TILs. See, e.g., Barber v. Ritter, 196 P.3d 238, 248-50 (Colo. 2008); Keller v.
Marion County Ambulance Dist., 820 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. 1991).
48 SHAVIRO, supra note 11, at 40.
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less.49
This confusion extends to considering other government
interventions. As we saw in Step 1, tax expenditures, which are
not subject to TILs regimes, expand the size of a government both
allocatively and distributively in much the same way as does
direct spending." Banning tax expenditures would not make the
situation better, even if that were possible (Step 2). After all, as
we discussed in Step 3, a well-designed credit can reduce the
footprint of the government.
To conclude this Part with an illustration, imagine you obtain
an injunction against your neighbor who is throwing noisy
parties. If your neighbor responds to the injunction by instead
playing loud music or turning up the television volume, your
injunction may have made your neighbor worse off to the extent
he would have preferred to throw parties, but you may well fail to
reduce your neighbor's adverse impact on you as the music or
television may prove even more bothersome than the parties. In
order to "starve the beast" of your neighbor's noise pollution, you
must be able to prevent all of your neighbor's noisy activities.
But when we move to the TILs context, as we will continue to
elaborate throughout this essay, it is simply not possible to
prevent all alternatives to government taxing and spending.
TILs thus cannot effectively "starve the beast." Instead, TILs
mostly serve to make governments less effective without reducing
the aggregate impact of government activity.
II. THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN TILS AND OTHER
COMPONENTS OF STATE FISCAL CONSTITUTIONS
Might TILs be more or less effective as part of a broader fiscal
constitution? After all, as a matter of history, TILs are relatively
recent, a response to dissatisfactions with older fiscal
constraints.' Thus, perhaps we need to consider how TILs
function in a more dynamic system of multiple forms of fiscal
constraints. One might believe that somehow two restrictions on
governments are better than one.52
19 Id. at 31.
50 Id.
5' Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis, supra note 7, at 31-33.
52 See, e.g., GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER To TAX:
ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FTSCAL CONSTITUTION 197-98 (1980) (arguing how
limits on the property tax can be a complement to jurisdictional competition as a
means of controlling the size of government).
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A. A Note on Hard Budget Constraints
Hard budget constraints at the subnational level are generally
deemed essential for the proper functioning of fiscal federalism.53
Without these constraints, subnational governments have little
incentive to live within their means because they can count on
bailouts from the central government. If this is the case, then a
federalist system with substantial subnational autonomy is about
the worst of all possible systems because lower level governments
can spend without being disciplined by a central hierarchy or the
market.54  Since the 1840s, when the American federal
government refused to bailout many fiscally troubled states, it
has been commonly understood that the American states operate
under a hard budget constraint, much like theory would dictate.55
The exact contours of the hard budget constraint is not entirely
clear in 2012, given, for example, the rise of significant state-
federal programs such as Medicaid, but this constraint clearly
remains formidable.
B. Balanced Budget Requirements (BBRs)
In response to finding themselves in dire fiscal straits with no
federal bailout possible, many states enacted BBRs in the 1840s;
similar restraints were then commonly imposed on local
governments in response to their fiscal woes in the 1870s.56 Most
American state and local governments currently function under
some kind of BBR.57
Though mandated by theory and present in practice, it is not
53 Barry R. Weingast, Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: The Implications
of Fiscal Incentives, 65 J. URB. ECON. 279, 285 (2009).
5" Jonathan Rodden, Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism, in WHEN STATES
Go BROKE 123, 123 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. eds., 2012). See
generally Jonathan Rodden et al., Introduction and Overview, in FISCAL
DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 3
(Jonathan Rodden et al. eds., 2003).
15 Robert P. Inman, Transfers and Bailouts: Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline
with Lessons from U.S. Federalism, in FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE
CHALLENGE OF HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, supra note 56, at 56-61.
56 Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis, supra note 7, at 31-32.
17 Because there is lack of agreement about what exactly constitutes a BBR,
there is no consensus as to how many states have BBRs. Nevertheless, many
scholars have written that every state except Vermont has some form of a BBR.
E.g., James M. Poterba, Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from
the States, 48 NAT'L TAx J. 329, 330 (1995). Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis put the
number of states at 40. Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis, supra note 7, at 33.
ALBANY GOVERNMENT LAW REVIEW
actually clear that BBRs have that much of an effect on the size
of state governments in the longer term.58 What is relatively
clear is that a TIL along with a BBR constrains state policy
choices in the short term.59 In other words, legislatures may find
ways to avoid BBRs, much like they evade TILs, say by keeping
major expenses off the books (e.g., pensions),6" but such long-term
strategies do not much help states pay their bills in the short
term when revenues collapse.6 Given a dramatic decrease in
revenue and a proscription on passing an "unbalanced" budget,
either spending must be cut or revenue must be raised. Yet TILs
make it much harder for revenue to be raised quickly.62 As a
matter of both efficiency and equity, increasing tax rates will,
however, often be the better answer.63 This is because a small
increase in taxes on the more wealthy can usually be expected to
have a smaller impact on the economy and overall societal well-
being than large cuts in services.' Thus, BBRs and TILs combine
to prevent a particularly desirable policy expedient.
We can put this point another way. BBRs already represent a
constraint on the political process, particularly at moments of
fiscal crisis. TILs are a new constraint on the political process,
58 Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis, supra note 7, at 23; see also Hou & Smith,
supra note 10, at 59 (summarizing inconclusive results). Note that Hou &
Smith do find that relatively technical BBRs (e.g., no carrying forward a
balance) do have an observable effect, at least on narrow measures of budgetary
balance. Hou & Smith, supra note 10, at 60, 70-72.
19 Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis, supra note 7, at 37-38.
60 It is at this time very commonly believed that states and municipalities
essentially violated BBRs through promising their current employees future
benefits, particularly pension benefits, that they did not properly account or
save for. See, e.g., Olivia S. Mitchell, Public Pension Pressures in the United
States, in WHEN STATES Go BROKE 57, 57 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel,
Jr. eds., 2012). On the one hand, this common belief is clearly grounded in fact,
as many municipalities have encountered dramatic difficulties funding their
pensions (e.g., Central Falls, Rhode Island) and certain state plans are woefully
underfunded by any measure (e.g., Illinois). Id. at 68-69. Yet there is a lot of
nuance involved in measuring the problem and in particular involving the
proper discount rate to apply in connection with current assets. Compare id. at
61-65, with Catherine Fisk & Brian Olney, Labor and the States' Fiscal
Problems, in WHEN STATES Go BROKE 253, 273-78 (Peter Conti-Brown & David
A. Skeel, Jr. eds., 2012). Furthermore, states and localities have begun
reforming their pension systems, especially as to newer employees, and the
impact of these (disparate) reforms is also very hard to predict. Mitchell, supra,
at 67-71.
61 Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis, supra note 7, at 37-38.
62 But they do not make it impossible. See infra Part III.
63 Gamage, supra note 45, at 774.
6 Id. at 772-74, 785-88, 90-91.
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particularly at moments of fiscal crisis. Combining the two kinds
of constraints seems to do more than double the restraint on state
government-perhaps increasing these problems
exponentially-but not in a manner that shrinks the size of
government.
C. Debt Limitation Procedures (DLPs), State and Local
The most venerable-and arguably effective-fiscal restraint
typical of state constitutions is the special Debt Limitation
Procedure (DLP).66 These procedures operate not by barring debt,
but, similar to a TIL, requiring some special procedure, usually a
vote of the people, if debt is to be issued.67 Also like TILs, DLPs
are easily avoided. 68 In the 19th century, state-level DLPs were a
response to state-level fiscal crises; the advent of state-level DLPs
forced more borrowing to the local level.69 Trouble with debt at
the local level led to local-level DLPs, and this then led to the
explosion of borrowing by special entities at both the state and
local levels.7" And that is where we are.
Given their porousness, it is tempting to see DLPs as failures,
but this might not be the right analysis. Taking a broad view, the
market for state and local borrowing is large and robust.7' There
are very few defaults, and the formal debt burden of states seems
manageable (versus "hidden" debts, like pension obligations,
perhaps).72 Furthermore, DLPs have generally succeeded in
preventing the regular borrowing for operating deficits at the
65 Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis, supra note 7, at 37 ("State governments grew
over most of the twentieth century, despite the proliferation of balanced budget
amendments.., and tax and expenditure limitations.").
66 Briffault, supra note 10, at 947-48.
67 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. CODE art. 16, § 18 (West 1996 & Supp. 2012).
61 See generally Briffault, supra note 10, at 925. Briffault states that:
As a result of the rise of revenue bonds, lease-financing arrangements,
subject-to-appropriation debt, and other various evasive techniques,
nearly three-quarters of all state debt and two-thirds of city and
county debt are "non-debt debts" exempt from the panoply of
substantive limitations on and procedural requirements for debt found
in state constitutions.
Id.
69 Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis, supra note 7, at 24-25.
70 Id. at 24; See also Briffault, supra note 10, at 919-22; ROBERT B. WARD,
NEW YORK STATE GOVERNMENT 289-97 (2d ed. 2006) (stating that a vast
majority of New York's debt issued by public authorities is not subject to New
York's debt limitation).
7' Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis, supra note 7, at 10.
72 Rodden, Introduction and Overview, supra note 54, at 138-40.
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state and local level; state and local borrowings are almost
entirely tied to a specific capital project.73
Why have debt limitation procedures had this relative success?
One compelling answer is that the nature of the procedures, and
the judicial doctrines interpreting them, impelled states and
localities to better financings.74 Thus, a requirement that a
separate vote be held on a borrowing, a vote where costs and
benefits were both before the voters, had a salutary effect on
political economy.75 Similarly, the judicial "special fund" doctrine
states that DLPs do not apply to debt to be repaid from a
dedicated fund "special fund," that is when repayment is not
promised from general taxes.76 Utilizing this doctrine to borrow
essentially requires financings to be self-supporting, because
their only means of repayment had to be the project itself, which
is a sensible result for fee-producing projects like water treatment
plants.77
This then gets us to the essential disanalogy between TILs and
DLPs, that is, that TILs undermine the connection between costs
and benefits. We will develop this point further below, but the
primary reason that TILs do this should be clear from the
argument to this point: because TILs are incoherent, they do not
make manifest any particular causal chain. TILs may serve to
keep tax rates stable, to cut tax liabilities through tax
expenditures, to increase the fees owed for government services,
and/or to increase other tax-like regulatory burdens. Both with
respect to citizens and consumers, TILs garble the signals that
government programs might otherwise send regarding costs and
benefits. This is in direct contrast to DLPs, which are supposed
to put before the voters a specific project, a specific price, and a
specific means of raising revenue."
Before proceeding to the interaction between TILs and DLPs,
we should observe that we are not uncritical of all DLPs. For
instance, DLPs have often been "strengthened" largely because of
73 See Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis, supra note 7, at 26.
74 Id. at 27.
71 See id. at 26.
76 Id.; see also ROBERT S. AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT
FINANCE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 183 (1992); Briffault, supra note 11, at
918-19.
77 Darien Shanske, Clearing Away Roadblocks to Funding California's
Infrastructure, 54 ST. TAX NOTES 567, 567 (2009) [hereinafter Clearing Away
Roadblocks].
78 See Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis, supra note 7, at 26-27.
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a perception that they did not sufficiently constrain borrowing. 9
We think that requiring legislators to get an additional majority
vote before borrowing is a significant, and generally adequate,
check on the issuance of excessive debt. We think requiring a
supermajority vote, a common rule at the local level, ° gives
minorities, which can be quite small, inordinate power.8
Remember, a local borrowing generally has to be proposed by a
democratically elected government and approved by a majority of
voters, and so the super majority on top of two levels of
democratic safeguards is excessive.82 In addition, new DLPs that
limit the use of assessment financing in particular are similarly
excessive. In the traditional case, an assessment must be
approved by an elected government body, can be stopped by a
majority of those to be assessed, and then is subject to judicial
review that the assessment is for a proportional benefit.83 New
DLPs not only fortify judicial review of assessments, but also
essentially require a majority vote on top of that.84 In sum, a DLP
should add one additional level of review, e.g., a majority vote of
the people, but ought not require more than that (e.g., also a
super majority). 5
To return to our question, how do TILs interact with DLPs? As
with tax-fee jurisprudence and BBRs, what TILs do is put
enormous stress on DLPs. Not every judicially-blessed evasion of
DLPs makes good sense from a public finance perspective. For
instance, there is a "contingent obligation" exception to DLPs. In
general, this reasonable exception states that DLPs do not apply
when a government has entered into a contingent obligation.86
Thus, if a city has decided that it makes more sense to lease a
new photocopier for three years rather than to buy one, then it
should be able to do so without holding an election-so too, if a
79 See, e.g., id. at 21.
80 CAL. CONST. art. 16, § 18(a).
81 See, e.g., Clearing Away Roadblocks, supra note 77.
82 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art, 13C, § 2(d).
83 See, e.g., Clearing Away Roadblocks, supra note 77.
84 CAL. CONST. art. 13C, § 2(d); see Clearing Away Roadblock, supra note 77.
85 One of us (Shanske) plans to return to the question of the appropriate level
of review of debt issuance in future work.
86 See, e.g., Rider v. City of San Diego, 959 P.2d 347, 353 (Cal. 1998) (stating
that "the debt limitation in section 18 [of the California Constitution] does not
apply when a local government enters into a contingent obligation"); see also
Briffault, supra note 10, at 920 (stating that courts do not find governmental
commitments to be "debts" in a constitutional sense so long as the payment is a
contingent obligation).
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school district wants to lease a portable classroom, or the police
department a new car. Of course, at some point these leases will
be for the kind of long-lived-and expensive-assets for which it
makes sense to borrow over the useful life of the asset.8 7 Can a
city-or state-constrained by a DLP lease finance a new school
or even a convention center without a special vote of the people?
The majority rule from courts interpreting DLPs is yes, so long as
the financing documents are in the form of a lease."8
As a matter of doctrine, this formalism makes some sense. It is
up to state or local legislators to decide when a lease term is too
long or not really a good deal; judges are not well suited to draw
these lines.89 Furthermore, at this point even very large lease
financing is understood by the market, and to the extent the
market serves as a check on subnational debt issuances, the
market also serves to discipline long-term leases. Market
participants (generally) understand that leases are to be paid out
of operating revenues, and they also know which entities are
constrained from increasing operating revenues by TILs.9 °
Accordingly, the market charges such entities more when they
borrow in the form of a lease than through an ordinary tax
increase secured borrowing.91 In sum, TILs make it very difficult
for governments to pay for any even vaguely capital project (e.g.,
portable classrooms or buses) with cash on hand, even if it makes
sense to do so. DLPs then make it difficult for governments to
borrow and secure an additional revenue stream to pay for
borrowing (e.g., a property tax increase), perhaps excessively so.
Governments, accordingly, enter into long-term leases instead of
using current funding or formally borrowing. Because of TILs
and DLPs, these long-term leases will often be more expensive
than they would otherwise be, as market participants understand
the constraints the government entities are operating under.
Finally, using more expensive leases puts further strain on
government operating budgets, and so the next time a required
project arises, the government will once again feel constrained to
use a lease structure rather than current funding.92 And so when
87 AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 76, at 216.
88 See, e.g., RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 868-70 (7th ed. 2009).
89 See id. at 870.
90 See Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis, supra note 7, at 26-27; see also Briffault,
supra note 10, at 919-20.
"' See Briffault, supra note 10, at 920.
92 See id.
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the inevitable fiscal crisis comes, a large percentage of the
operating budget will have been promised to long-term capital
leases, requiring even more dramatic cuts elsewhere.
D. Jurisdiction Competition and Local TILs
As indicated above, the American federal system adheres
rather well to the ideals of fiscal federalism, even though that
adherence was not planned.93 This is true both for the relative
credibility of the no bailout pledge in the United States, and for
the large number of jurisdictions in the United States competing
with each other. In competing with one another, the different
jurisdictions, like private actors, are theorized to be honing their
particular offering of costs and benefits. In doing so, the overall
size of government is thought to restrain-at least at the local
level, where there is most competition-homevoters94 who are
only paying for the governmental services that they want.95 This
approach to local government, generally associated with the work
of Charles Tiebout,96 is far from indisputable on normative or
empirical grounds.97 Yet there is little question that, as a theory,
the Tiebout model makes at least some sense as a way to restrain
government, and there is some evidence that it has restrained
government in practice.9 Thus, though not an explicit part of state
fiscal constitutions,99 jurisdictional competition is certainly a
93 See supra Part I.A.
14 This is William Fischel's felicitous phrase, and his book is the modern
classic embracing jurisdictional competition. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE
HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001).
95 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416 (1956).
96 See generally id.
97 See, e.g., Darien Shanske, Above All Else Stop Digging: Local Government
Law as a (Partial) Cause of (and Solution to) the Current Housing Crisis, 43 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 663, 682-96 (2010) [hereinafter Above All Else].
98 See id. at 686, 691; see WALLACE E. OATES, The Many Faces of the Tiebout
Model, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR
OF WALLACE OATES 21, 35-36, 42 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006). Even critics of
the Tiebout model on normative grounds acknowledge its relative explanatory
power. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II- Localism and Legal
Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 405-06, 417 (1990).
99 In many ways, jurisdictional competition is implicit to both state and
federal law. For instance, localities are given extensive powers over zoning and
other local regulation by state law which power is then shielded from
interference by modern federal (and state) equal protection clause jurisprudence
as well as state homerule provisions. See, e.g., Above All Else, supra note 97, at
682-85, 700-01.
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means for controlling the size of government, and a means that,
as a matter of theory and practice, has been more successful than
TILs.'00
How do TILs interact with jurisdictional competition? TILs at
the local level obstruct the proper functioning of jurisdictional
competition because localities cannot modulate their rates in
competition with one another.' °' Now, up to this point, we have
focused primarily on state-level TILs, but TILs are often in place
at the local level. As limitations in connection with property
taxes, many local-level TILs predate state-level TILs. Regardless
of the sequence, the two levels of TILs are generally seen as
complements. California Proposition 13 is the classic example of
this. Proposition 13, famous for restricting local property taxes,
imposed two TILs: one on local governments as to other forms of
taxation, and the other on California's legislature as to all forms
of taxation.'02
TILs at the state level have a similar impact on inter-state
jurisdictional competition. Suppose, for instance, that California
wants to be more like Texas."3 California could lower or abolish
its non-Texas taxes (e.g., the Corporate Income Tax) by majority
vote, but to add a new Texas tax (i.e., the Margin Tax)0 4 or
increase an existing alternative tax (i.e., the property tax) or
improve another existing tax (e.g., taxing sales of services) would
require a supermajority vote or, in the case of the property tax, a
constitutional amendment.' 5). In addition, "another debilitating
[impact] of local TILs is that they put pressure on state budgets to
fund services that could have been more efficiently funded
'oo See id. at 687-88.
101 See FISCHEL, supra note 94, at 98-128.
102 CAL. CONST. art 13A, §§ 1-4 (§§ 1 and 2 restricting property taxes; § 3
state-level TILs; § 4 local-level TILs).
13 Pondering shifting California's tax structure to more resemble that of
Texas is actually of interest to at least some California lawmakers. See, e.g.,
Memorandum from Christopher Thornberg, Ph. D., on Revenue Implications of
the Tex. Tax Structure to Cal. Legislative Bodies (Mar. 12, 2012) available at
http://arev.assembly.ca.gov/sites/arev.assembly.ca.gov/files/Thornberg-Testimon
y.pdf.
104 California's proposed Business Net Receipts Tax resembled Texas's
Margin Tax. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0002 (West 2008) (detailing what is
exempt-from qualifying as a tax entity under the Tax Code, including sole
proprietorships and general partnerships); CAL. COMM'N ON THE 21ST CENTURY
ECON., FINAL REPORT 41-42 (2009), http://www.cotce.ca.gov/documents/reports/
documents/Commission on the 21stCenturyEconomy-FinalReport.pdf.
'o" CAL. CONST. art. XVIIIA, § 3 (requiring a two thirds vote to pass
legislation that increases taxes).
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locally."'' 6 Not only is this a less efficient use of revenues, states
typically rely on more volatile revenue sources; thus TILs at the
local level increase volatility at the state level-yet state level
TILs then make it more difficult for states to adjust their tax
rates to cope with this combination of greater responsibility and
volatility.' 7
E. A Concluding Note on Doctrinal Stress and
"Completomania"08
We have now explained multiple ways in which TILs put undue
stress on important doctrines relating to taxation and public
finance, such as the tax-fee distinction and the debt-lease
distinction. We wish to make a few more points about the notion
of doctrinal stress. By warning about stress in connection with
these doctrines, we are not thereby signaling that we believe that
these doctrines are unsound, where "unsound" means, at the very
least, un-administrable because there is no tractable conceptual
content. There are unsound doctrines, such as, in our view, the
notion of a "traditional government function."'0 9 Such doctrines
also wither under stress, but we believe they were always
destined to do so. There is no such dire destiny for sensible
distinctions such as that between a long-term borrowing and a
lease. This distinction is sound: it is administrable, reasonable,
and important. It makes sense that because of concerns over
generational equity that debt requires additional procedures, and
it also makes sense that governments need to be able to lease
without going through these procedures. The problem is that
judging is an exercise in practical reasoning; there is no
106 Part II, supra note 1, at 249.
"I7 For further discussion, see generally Preventing State Budget Crises, supra
note 45, at 749-60.
100 This phrase is from Marianne Constable and much of the analysis also
(loosely) follows from her work. MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER:
THE MIXED JURY AND CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND
KNOWLEDGE 91 (1994) ("When a 'complete' code exists, new situations raise
uncertainties about written law that must be addressed either through
interpretation or further legislation"). See generally MARIANNE CONSTABLE, JUST
SILENCES: THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF MODERN LAW 111-31 (2005).
"I9 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 539 (1985);
Edward A. Zelinsky, The False Modesty of Department of Revenue v. Davis:
Disrupting the Dormant Commerce Clause Through the Traditional Public
Function Doctrine, 29 VA. TAX REV. 407, 421-22 (2010).
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algorithm for automatically distinguishing leases from debts."'
Yet by slow process of common law reasoning, workable rules of
thumb can be developed."' The key is to avoid putting so much
stress on governments that they devise so many borderline
financings that they overwhelm this piecemeal judicial process.
Yet this is what TILs threaten to do.
That TILs frustrate the application of practical reasoning
should not be surprising. After all, TILs are part of a dynamic
where new-and seemingly ever more stringent-rules are
devised when there is frustration with the ordinary workings of
the political process, a process that is irreducibly the domain of
messy practical reasoning."2 Accordingly, TILs, the most current
form of a rule-based approach to political decisions, do not work
any better than the rules that preceded TILs. Indeed TILs work
less well because, for little or no gain, they obstruct the
functioning of superior ways to limit, or at least channel, the size
of government." 3  Note that these superior ways, such as
moderate DLPs and jurisdictional competition, give much more
sway to the ordinary operation of politics; their success seems
largely attributable to making politics "better" by making it
clearer to voters what it is that they are voting on.'14
"' The key points here are from Aristotle. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS bk. 6, ch. 3 (defining scientific knowledge - episteme - as knowledge of
necessary truths), ch. 5 (defining practical knowledge - phronesis - as
knowledge of matters that can be otherwise), ch. 8 (explaining that therefore
political science requires practical knowledge).
. To use Karl Llewellyn's phrase, what great judges posses is "situation
sense," which is what allows them to craft (and revise) functional judicial
categories and rules. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS 121, 402 (1960); see also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST
LAWYER: FAILING IDEAS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 35-36, 209-10, 224-25 (1993)
(making the same point, tracing it to Llewellyn and Aristotle and observing that
this is the kind of practical wisdom that is being lost); Darien Shanske,
Revitalizing Aristotle's Doctrine of Equity, 4 L. CULTURE & HUMAN. 352, 352,
354-55, 376, 381 (2008) (arguing, among other things, that modern
jurisprudence systematically suppresses the role of practical reasoning,
maintaining that "[w]e are in a sense defined by practices and norms that deny
that we are defined by practices and norms.").
..2 For further discussion of fee jurisprudence, see infra Part III.C.
" Part II, supra note 1, at 249.
"4 Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis, supra note 7, at 38.
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III. THINKING MORE PRECISELY ABOUT THE EVASION OF
TILs"5
It might be objected that up to now we have assumed too
quickly that TILs can be evaded through tax expenditures. Might
a more restrictively designed TIL prevent the use of tax
expenditures as an evasion strategy? For instance, suppose that
the language of a given TIL provision was the following:
[A]ny changes in State taxes enacted for the purpose of increasing
revenues collected pursuant thereto whether by increased rates or
changes in methods of computation must be imposed by an Act
passed by not less than two-thirds of all members elected to each of
the two houses of the Legislature ... 16
An objector might grant that this provision allows for a state
government to spend through the tax code, but how does a
legislature evade a provision like this and simultaneously raise
revenues? We will now explore the evasion of TILs in some depth
in order to put an exclamation point at the end of our critique of
TILs.
A. The Tax Expenditure Strategy
Returning to the TIL provision we quoted above, note that the
central language refers to "any changes in State taxes enacted for
the purpose of increasing revenues"' "7-this still leaves a lot of
room for maneuver. Thus, instead of increasing taxes generally
in order to fund new spending, a majority party can just pass a
new tax credit to fund a desired program while increasing other
taxes or reducing other tax expenditures. The overall tax
package would be revenue-neutral in that it would not increase
overall taxes, but it would in effect accomplish the majority
party's spending and taxing goals, because the tax expenditure
would substitute for the increased spending, while the tax shift
would transfer tax liability to where the majority wanted it to
5 Portions of Part III of this article are taken from Part II, supra note 1.
"16 This language is from California's TIL prior to the passage of Proposition
26 in November 2010. Compare CAL. CONST. art. 13A, § 3 (1996), with CAL.
CONST. art. 13A, § 3(a) (2012) (amending the provision to reflect that any higher
tax burden must be voted upon prior to implementation as well as detailing key
exceptions to the use of the word "tax."); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 9, §
22(A)-(D) (2001).
... CAL. CONST. art. 13A, § 3 (1996).
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be." In theory, there are no limits to the types of programs that
could be funded in this manner. Businesses and high-income
individual taxpayers could be given dollar-for-dollar tax credits
against their higher taxes in exchange for donating to state
spending programs (e.g., universities, health programs), thus
systematically exchanging public funding for nominally private
funding. The more tax instruments a state has, the easier this
will be; but even a state without an income tax can favor all
manner of programs through sales tax expenditures (while
simultaneously raising the sales tax on other goods or services)." 9
In short, the tax expenditure strategy relies on TILs not
applying to revenue-neutral packages that reduce taxes on some
taxpayers (through tax expenditures) while increasing taxes on
other taxpayers. For most existing state TILs, this strategy
should suffice for the majority party to evade TILs to the extent
the majority party so desires. But if the tax expenditure strategy
is not available, then a majority party might still employ our
second strategy-the benefit charges with refundable tax credits
strategy.
B. The Benefit Charges With Refundable Tax Credits Strategy
The essence of this second strategy is to transform the funding
mechanism for government programs to benefit charges instead
of general fund expenditures. To defray the distributional impact
of these benefit charges, the state would then provide refundable
tax credits against the state income tax (or against some other
state tax, for states without income taxes).'2 ° Those refundable
credits should phase out with income, so that low-income
taxpayers could be completely reimbursed for benefit charges,
whereas higher-income taxpayers would be reimbursed only
partially.'2 ' For example, consider tuition at public colleges and
universities. Even today, tuition at those schools is a relative
bargain compared with that at many private colleges, and yet
recent dramatic increases in tuition still undermine the public
purpose of state schools of providing affordable public higher
" For some examples, see supra Part I.A.
'1 And enacting this strategy through business tax expenditures would be
even easier.
20 See, e.g., Darien Shanske, Going Forward by Going Backward to Benefit
Taxes, 3 CAL. J. POL. & POL'Y 1, 3 (2011), available at http://www.degruyter.com/
view/j/cjpp.2011.3.2/cjpp.2011.3.2.1133/cjpp.2011.3.2.1133.xml.
.2 For more on this approach, see id.
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education. The solution to the riddle here could be to allow
tuition at public colleges and universities to remain high--or even
to become higher-but to then use tax credits to keep those
schools affordable for lower-income students. State higher
education credits could be administered, for example, through the
state income tax and could be modeled on federal higher
education tax credits. The credits could be made refundable so
that taxpayers without tax liability would still be helped.
Individual taxpayers might still face liquidity issues even with
refundable credits, because lower-income taxpayers could have
trouble paying benefit charges, like tuition, upfront and then
waiting for a state income tax return. To address that problem,
the tax credits could be made advanceable. The Affordable Care
Act's Premium Tax Credits in the new IRC section 36B.22 is an
example of how tax credits can be made advanceable. Under
section 36B, state exchanges can make advance payments of the
premium tax credits to pay for health insurance for low-income
taxpayers, with the taxpayers then reconciling the advance
payments with the amount of the tax credits that they are
allowed when they file their tax returns. 23  Similarly, for
example, state universities could receive advanceable state tax
credits to cover low-income taxpayers' tuition.'24
By using the benefit charges plus refundable tax credits
strategy, which we will henceforth call "BCPP" (Benefit Charges
Plus Progressivity), a majority party can effectively evade TILs,
because funding can be increased for state spending programs
without actually needing to raise explicit taxes or spending.'25
122 I.R.C. § 36B (2006).
123 For further discussion of how this works, see, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky,
The Health-Related Tax Provisions of PPACA and HCERA: Contingent,
Complex, Incremental and Lacking Cost Controls (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. L.
Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal Stud., Working Paper No. 301, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633556http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633556
(summarizing the many tax provisions of the Affordable Care Act); see also
David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising From the Tax Provisions of Health
Care Reform Why Further Reforms are Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low
and Moderate Income, 65 TAx L. REV. 669 (2012) [hereinafter How the ACA Will
Create Perverse Incentives].
24 There are tradeoffs involved in making tax credits advanceable. Doing so
requires a reconciliation process, wherein taxpayers whose income ends up
being higher than predicted might be required to pay back excess advanceable
credits received, which can create complicated enforcement issues. We cannot
fully analyze these tradeoffs here. Instead, we merely mean to point out the
possibility of making credits advanceable in order to deal with liquidity issues.
125 See, e.g., How the ACA Will Create Perverse Incentives, supra note 123, at
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The limit on this strategy is the preexisting state income tax or
other preexisting state taxes.'26 Refundable tax credits can be
used to completely alleviate the expense of benefit charges for
low-income taxpayers, but positive tax liabilities cannot be
assessed on high-income taxpayers in excess of their preexisting
tax liability.127
Hence, taken to the limit, preexisting state taxes become the
mechanism for achieving progressivity in state spending under
the BCPP strategy. Further, the preexisting income tax and
other general taxes (or other sources of revenue, like federal
grants) fund any government programs not entirely fundable
through benefit charges.
C. What About California's Proposition 26?
In November 2010, California's Proposition 26 modified its TIL
regime partially in response to the success of a version of the tax
expenditure strategy.'28 The new rule is as follows: "Any change
in state statute which results in any taxpayer paying a higher
tax * * * must be imposed by an act passed by not less than two-
thirds of all members elected to each of the two houses of the
Legislature . ".1.."29
This new rule prevents the simple tax expenditure strategy for
evading TILs.30 The kind of shifts in tax burden required to
achieve a revenue-neutral package will increase the taxes on at
least "any" taxpayer, meaning that any such proposal requires a
supermajority. 3' As for this new rule, we should immediately
note that . . . its apparent success comes at a great cost.
Proposition 26-like TILs interfere with traditional "base
broadening plus rate lowering" tax reform-the model for
traditional, and efficient, bipartisan tax reform. This is because
40 (explaining how this strategy can be used to mitigate certain problems with
the Affordable Care Act).
.26 Refundable tax credits can be implemented through other state taxes in
addition to the income tax, although doing so is somewhat more complicated.
127 Id. at 40.
,28 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 13A, § 3(c) (Proposition 26 is retroactive to
January 1, 2010 and thus appears to invalidate the swap); 2010 Cal. Legis. Serv.
Prop. 26 § 1(e) (West) (new, stricter TIL seems to target this "swap"); Lenny
Goldberg, California Governor Approves Gas Tax Swap, ST. TAX TODAY, Mar. 26,
2010 (describing complicated revenue-neutral package).
129 CAL. CONST. art. 13A, § 3(a).
3 See supra Part III.A.
"' CAL. CONST. art. 13A, § 3(a).
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closing any tax loophole increases the taxes on "any taxpayer,"'
even if the overall package reduces rates on most taxpayers. The
Tax Reform Act of 1986, and all the various bipartisan proposals
currently floating about Washington and the states would require
a supermajority under this new rule.
Moreover, Proposition 26 does not prevent the BCPP strategy.
Proposition 26's supermajority rule applies to "taxes," but taxes
are defined to exclude benefit-type charges. For instance, the
following is not a tax, and is thus not subject to the supermajority
rule: "[a] charge imposed for a specific government service or
product provided directly to the payor that is not provided to
those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs
to the State of providing the service or product to the payor."'
' 32
Thus, the California State legislature or local governments'33
can increase benefit charges by majority vote just as it can add
tax expenditures by majority vote, and so even Proposition 26-
style TILs can be evaded.
If one is committed to the notion that there is some rule that
can be formulated to prevent the BCPP strategy,134 then the next
step could be for TILs to include all possible government charges,
as the TIL-provision in Missouri seems to do:
Counties and other political subdivisions are hereby prohibited
from levying any tax, license or fees, not authorized by law,
charter or self-enforcing provisions of the constitution when this
section is adopted or from increasing the current levy of an
existing tax, license or fees, above that current levy authorized by
law or charter when this section is adopted without the approval
of the required majority of the qualified voters of that county or
other political subdivision voting thereon.'35
Despite the broad language restricting "any tax, license or
fee,"'36 the Missouri Supreme Court has interpreted this
language not to require elections in connection with "fee increases
which are 'general and special revenues' but not a 'tax,"'
specifically holding "that increases in the specific charges for
services actually provided by an ambulance district are not
132 Id. § 3(b)(2).
"I Proposition 26 made parallel changes to the ability of local governments to
raise taxes. See CAL. CONST. art. 13C, § 1(e).
114 In other words, if one is suffering from some form of "completomania". See
CONSTABLE, supra note 108, at 91.
"' MO. CONST. art. X, § 22(a).
136 Id.
ALBANY GOVERNMENT LAW REVIEW
subject to [the Missouri TIL] .""
And even without a favorable judicial interpretation of this
sort, a variation on the BCPP strategy would still be viable. All
that would be needed would be to partially privatize state
spending programs, like universities, while keeping them highly
regulated so that they continue to operate in a fashion similar to
how they were run as state spending programs, and then provide
tax credits for payments made to these new quasi-private
entities.' In other words, no fee that could be argued to be a tax
would be required.
Moreover, there is a sound reason that proponents of TILs-
and courts in interpreting the intentions of these proponents-
have not applied TILs to benefit charges, and that is, as noted
above, the tax-fee distinction serves an important purpose.
Viewed practically, what would it be like for tuition at state
colleges, public parking rates, building permit fees, etc. all to be
subject to a supermajority requirement? 139 As a matter of theory,
why should the voters impose extraordinary constraints on
elected legislators in connection with charges that they, the
voters, will usually only have to pay.., by opting to engage in a
voluntary activity?
D. How Should These Strategies Be Evaluated?
Let us assume that these strategies have been explicitly
utilized.' Should we consider these strategies to be
"I Keller v. Marion Cnty. Ambulance Dist., 820 S.W.2d 301, 303, 305 (Mo.
1991) (en banc); see also Arbor Inv. Co. v. City of Hermann, 341 S.W.3d 673, 675,
678-82 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) (reviewing history of tax-fee jurisprudence in
Missouri, affirming use of five factor test as useful, and then affirming lower
court finding that utility charges were fees and not taxes).
138 The eligibility for tax credits for payments to these quasi-private entities
could be made conditional on the quasi-private entities complying with state
regulations. In this fashion, the state can ensure that tax credits are only
issued to the extent these entities fulfill a public purpose in a similar fashion to
how the entities would have been run had they remained state spending
programs rather than quasi-private entities.
"I This is not to say that provisions like Proposition 26 and its predecessor,
Proposition 218, do not complicate utilizing benefit-type financing. The
ambiguities in both measures have resulted in an enormous amount of litigation
and uncertainty-hence the doctrinal stress. See generally Halperin, supra note
35. On California's Proposition 218, which specifically targeted special
assessments, a particularly venerable and potentially useful type of benefit
charge. See, e.g., Clearing Away Roadblocks, supra note 77, at 569-70.
140 We can only offer educated intuitions as to the extent to which these
evasion strategies are actually in use, but we do think that these strategies are
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unscrupulous dodges? We think not. There is ample evidence
that voters desire both lower taxes and increased spending on all
of the major programs on which governments spend significant
resources. 4 ' TILs are one outgrowth of this bias in voters' fiscal
preferences. This bias is particularly problematic because voters
appear to have little understanding of what state governments
actually do. And thus these evasions are perhaps just a way of
responding to voters' inconsistent demands regarding taxes and
spending.
There is a deeper point to be considered about the shift to
benefit-type taxes. The primary mechanism through which state
governments have historically functioned in the face of voters'
fiscal biases and irrationality is through representative
government. Elected representatives made the hard choices that
voters were unwilling to make. But TILs undermine the elected
representatives' model, and grow from voters' loss of trust in that
model.
The benefit taxes model can also function as a partial
replacement for the elected representatives' model. In effect, the
benefit taxes model relies on the market to determine fiscal
priorities, as taxpayers must pay for more of the costs of
governance through direct benefit charges. Instead of wholly
relying on elected representatives to determine fiscal priorities,
the benefit taxes model relies much more on the choices made by
individual state citizens acting as consumers. By using the BCPP
strategy-combining benefit charges with progressive refundable
tax credits-a state can employ the market-based benefit taxes
model for making allocative fiscal decisions, while continuing to
employ the elected representatives model for making distributive
fiscal decisions.'42 Markets are generally superior to elected
used, at least to some extent (if implicitly) and can certainly be used more often.
In the last decades, and particularly since the imposition of limitations on the
local property tax, there has been an explosion in the use of benefit-type
charges. Ross E. Coe, Federalism's Vanguard: Local Government User Fees, 61
ST. TAx NOTES 561, 567 (2011). State-level tax expenditures have long been-
and remain-very substantial. See Three Essays, supra note 16, at 52.
However, we do not know of a specific instance where a tax expenditure was
explicitly linked to a higher fee. As noted above, in at least some instances,
state legislatures have explicitly made use of our first evasion strategy, passing
revenue-neutral packages in order to evade TILs. See supra Part IV.A.
141 See, e.g., Three Essays, supra note 16, at 96; David Gamage, Managing
California's Fiscal Roller Coaster, 49 ST. TAx NOTES 659, 663 (2008).
142 For the original distinction between allocative and distributive fiscal
policy, see RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN
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representatives at making allocative decisions, but markets on
their own are not capable of enacting most forms of distributive
policies that voters might desire.
It is generally, and correctly, maintained that, by mimicking
the market to the extent possible, providing a service with a
benefit charge should usually be more efficient than paying for a
service with a general tax.143 By directly connecting payments to
the services received, benefit charges mitigate the incentives to
change behavior that results in traditional forms of taxation
creating excess burden (a.k.a. "deadweight loss"). 44 The use of
the BCPP strategy can thus limit the size of government in at
least two ways. First, to the extent benefit charges better reflect
the level of government services that people want, benefit charges
are more politically efficacious in shaping the government in
accordance with the voters' wishes. Second, to the extent benefit
charges raise funds while creating less excess burden or
deadweight loss, benefit charges reduce the distortionary impact
that government activity imposes on the larger economy.
E. Back To Jurisdictional Competition
Ultimately, the BCPP strategy controls the size of government,
because it is a partial form of jurisdictional competition, which is
itself a kind of market mechanism. BCPP controls the size of
government, because it better matches individual citizens to
individual services. However, to reach its full potential, the
BCPP solution must also match individuals to entire jurisdictions
in a Tiebout fashion-that is, there must be a jurisdictional
marketplace. There are only so many government services, such
as higher education, that can be provided individually. Key
government services, particularly at the local level, tend to come
in bundles-e.g., K-12 education, police, and parks.'45 There is a
particular local government levy that, to some extent,' 46 acts as a
PUBLIC ECONOMY 17 (1959).
143 See generally Richard M. Bird & Thomas Tsiopoulos, User Charges for
Public Services: Potentials and Problems, 45 CAN. TAX J. 25 (1997).
144 For discussion of these concepts, see Three Essays, supra note 16, at 61-
65.
141 Above All Else, supra note 97, at 703-04 (discussing local amenity
"bundling rules").
146 See, e.g., Darien Shanske, How Less Can Be More: Using the Federal
Income Tax to Stabilize State and Local Finance, 31 VA. TAX REV. 413, 456
(2012) (reviewing the evidence and concluding that there is an argument that
property taxes function as benefit taxes at least partially). Other local levies,
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blended price for these local amenities, and this is the property
tax. Yet, as we have seen,'47 TILs at the local level obstruct the
proper functioning of jurisdictional competition as to taxes.'48
Furthermore, ever more elaborate TILs and DLPs, though they
do not prevent the use of the BCPP strategy, add stresses to
governments trying to levy fees in the manner jurisdictional
competition would encourage. The BCPP strategy thus
simultaneously illustrates the vacuity of TILs, because TILs can
be evaded while also demonstrating the needless hurdles to sound
governance that TILs erect (because the BCPP strategy is likely
to lead to lots of tax-fee litigation).
CONCLUSION
There are a few key points we wish to emphasize in conclusion.
First, despite their seemingly simple structure and goal, TILs
should not be assumed to shrink state governments-or to even
make conceptual sense. Instead, TILs primarily serve to
undermine the effectiveness of government programs without
necessarily reducing the size of government. This is reason
enough to eschew TILs. But there is another reason to avoid
TILs, and that is that they potentially impede superior means for
controlling the size of government-most notably, jurisdictional
competition.
The political dynamic that has given us TILs appears to us to
represent a general disgust with the operation of ordinary
political decision making as to public budgeting. Yet sometimes
the most dramatic gestures can leave everything one despises
intact, or even make things worse. Imagine a batter taking a
home run swing and striking out. Singles can also win games,
and so too the political process can be shifted through less
dramatic measures. Sticking with our metaphor, one can either
swing for the fences and miss with a TIL or bunt the runners
forward with jurisdictional competition' 49 -it turns out to be quite
such as parcel taxes, assessments, and development impact fees can also serve
as part of a blended price for a local amenity bundle.
147 See supra Part III.D.
148 Part II, supra note 1, at 247-49.
149 There are other political reforms that we believe are worth considering,
reforms that channel the political process sensibly. For example, Leib and
Elmendorf propose that, in case of a budget impasse, there should be a direct
vote of the electorate on one of two completed state budgets-each budget
having been prepared by one of the major political parties. Ethan J. Leib &
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difficult to do both.
Christopher S. Elemendorf, Why Party Democrats Need Popular Democracy and
Popular Democrats Need Parties, 100 CAL. L. REV. 69, 104-05 (2012).
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